Countries › Paraguay › Guide › 13. Regulation › Cartels and abuse of dominance in Paraguay: prohibited conduct, CONACOM investigations, fines and appeals

Cartels and abuse of dominance in Paraguay: prohibited conduct, CONACOM investigations, fines and appeals

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Last verified: 2026-10-28 · Status: Stable

Ley 4956/2013 bans agreements and concerted or consciously parallel practices that restrict competition, abuse of a dominant position, predatory pricing and abusive tying, and applies to foreign firms whose conduct has effects in Paraguay. CONACOM investigates for 90 days (extendable once), then the accused has 18 days to answer and up to 40 days for evidence; fines reach 150 percent of the illicit profit or 20 percent of affected sales over 12 months, never less than the advantage gained. There is no leniency programme in the law or its decree, but cases can end through a cease commitment that is not an admission, and damages claims in court require a final CONACOM resolution.

USD figures use PYG 5,868.31 per US dollar, the Banco Central del Paraguay reference quotation for 28 October 2026. Amounts set in minimum wages use the monthly minimum wage of PYG 3,044,000 and the daily minimum wage (jornal) of PYG 117,077 in force since 1 July 2026 under Resolución MTESS 670/2026. Conversions are for orientation only and move with each wage adjustment.

Key facts

Maximum competition fine	20% of 12 months affected gross sales or 150% of illicit profit Ley 4956/2013 art. 63, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Statutory leniency programme	No Ley 4956/2013; Decreto 1490/2014, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Investigation phase	90 business days, extendable once business daysLey 4956/2013 art. 38 and 50, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Board decision term after closing briefs	40 business daysLey 4956/2013 art. 59, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Prescription of infringements and damages claims	4 yearsLey 4956/2013 art. 65, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Reconsideration filing term	10 business daysLey 4956/2013 art. 67, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Term to sue before the Tribunal de Cuentas	18 business daysLey 4956/2013 art. 68, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Applies to conduct abroad with effects in Paraguay	Yes Ley 4956/2013 art. 3, as of 2026-10-28 · in force

The rule

1. Prohibited agreements. Any agreement, decision, concerted or consciously parallel practice, written or verbal, formal or informal, that has the object or effect, actual or potential, of preventing, restricting or distorting competition in all or part of the national market is prohibited, including: fixing or recommending abusive prices or trading conditions; unjustifiably limiting output, distribution, technical development or investment; sharing markets, customers or supply sources; discrimination; tying; collusive bidding; output or sales quotas; concerted refusals to buy; and collective exclusion from agreements or associations decisive for competition. CONACOM must weigh efficiency gains the parties prove. The decree describes bid rigging in public and private tenders, auctions and sales, and lists indicators CONACOM uses, such as price patterns and signs of coordination in bid documents.
Cost to do it: No filing cost; exposure is the art. 63 fine.
Example: Three distributors that agree by messaging app to raise retail prices by 8 percent breach art. 8 a), whether the agreement is written or not. / Two importers dividing Paraguay's departments between them breach art. 8 c) even if the arrangement was agreed abroad, if it has effects in Paraguay (art. 3 num. 2).Ley Nº 4956/2013, art. 2 and 8; Decreto Nº 1490/2014, art. 5 and 6, Ley 4956 art. 2, 8; Decreto 1490 art. 5, 6, 2013-05-29 official text · verified 2026-10-28

2. Abuse of dominance, predatory pricing and abusive tying. Holding a dominant position (not being exposed to effective and substantial competition for a product or service) is not punished as such; abusing it is. Abuse includes unfair prices or terms, limiting production or development, unjustified refusal to supply, discrimination, tying, and obtaining prices, payment terms or extra charges under threat of breaking off the commercial relationship. Dominance is assessed on substitutability (domestic or imported), regulatory barriers and the ability to set prices unilaterally. Non occasional sales below effective production or acquisition cost, or without a profit margin, aimed at excluding competitors are prohibited as predatory pricing, with exceptions for perishables, obsolete goods, cheaper restocking, price matching a competitor and clearance sales. Conduct of a controlled company is attributable to whoever controls it.
Cost to do it: No filing cost; exposure is the art. 63 fine and orders to stop the conduct.
Example: A dominant supermarket chain that demands extra listing fees from a supplier under threat of delisting falls under art. 9 a) 6. / A foreign parent is jointly answerable for an abuse by its Paraguayan subsidiary when the parent determines its commercial conduct (art. 5).Ley Nº 4956/2013, art. 5, 9, 10 and 11; Decreto Nº 1490/2014, art. 8 and 9, Ley 4956 art. 5, 9, 10, 11, 2013-05-29 official text · verified 2026-10-28

3. Investigation procedure. Cases start ex officio or on a complaint by anyone with knowledge of the facts; complainants must identify themselves but can ask that their identity be kept confidential. Once an investigation opens, the Dirección de Investigación has 90 days, extendable once for the same term, to investigate, summon witnesses, request documents from anyone and commission market studies, and then reports recommending dismissal or charges. The accused has 18 days to answer the charges and may request up to 40 days to produce evidence; each side then has 15 days for closing briefs and the board decides within 40 days. If the board does not decide in time, the complaint is deemed rejected and the accused acquitted. All terms are business days. CONACOM may order interim measures such as cease orders, hearing the parties in 5 days and deciding in 3, and requires a bond from private applicants.
Cost to do it: No procedural fees: CONACOM proceedings are free of charge for the parties (art. 32).
Example: From opening to decision, a contested case can run about 90 + 90 (extension) + 18 + 40 + 15 + 40 business days, roughly 293 business days or about 14 months. / Defence costs are the main expense; there is no official fee to answer a CONACOM case.Ley Nº 4956/2013, art. 38, 45 to 60, Ley 4956 art. 38, 46, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59 and 60, 2013-05-29 official text · verified 2026-10-28

4. Fines and other sanctions. Infringements are sanctioned with a warning and cease order, a declaration of nullity, and fines of up to 150 percent of the profit obtained from the conduct or up to 20 percent of gross sales of the products concerned in the affected relevant market over the 12 months before the proceeding opened, excluding taxes, and never less than the advantage obtained when quantifiable. Fines are graded by the type and reach of the restriction, market size, market share, effects, duration, intent, repetition and breach of a cease commitment, must not cause economic ruin, and can be paid in instalments on a reasoned request. CONACOM may sue to collect, including attachment of assets. Fines go 50 percent to the Treasury and 50 percent to CONACOM. Individuals who represented the company and took part are also within the law's scope.
Cost to do it: Up to 20 percent of 12 months affected sales or 150 percent of illicit profit.
Example: A distributor with PYG 20,000,000,000 of affected sales in the last 12 months faces a fine of up to PYG 4,000,000,000 under the 20 percent test. / On about US$3,408,136 of affected sales, the 20 percent ceiling is about US$681,627.Ley Nº 4956/2013, art. 3 num. 3, 62, 63 and 66, Ley 4956 art. 3, 62, 63, 66, 2013-05-29 official text · verified 2026-10-28

5. Settlements: cease commitments and conventional termination. At any stage the board, on the investigation director's opinion, may approve a cease commitment, which is not an admission of the facts or of illegality. It must include the obligation to stop the conduct within a set term, a daily fine for breach and periodic reporting, including on changes in ownership, control, activities and location. The case is suspended while the commitment is honoured and archived when it ends. CONACOM may also agree a conventional termination of an investigation, hearing interested parties, unless it is contrary to law or harms third parties. Neither the law nor its decree provides a leniency or immunity programme for cartel whistleblowers.
Cost to do it: The cost is the daily fine agreed for breach and the compliance reporting burden.
Example: A trade association under investigation for a price recommendation offers to withdraw it, train members and report quarterly; the case is suspended and later archived. / Breaching an approved commitment is itself an infringement (art. 62) and an aggravating factor for the fine (art. 63 h).Ley Nº 4956/2013, art. 29 ll) and m), 51, 52 and 53; Decreto Nº 1490/2014, art. 88 and 89, Ley 4956 art. 52 and 53; Decreto 1490 art. 88 and 89, 2013-05-29 official text · verified 2026-10-28

6. Appeals, private enforcement and limitation. Against CONACOM resolutions only reconsideration is available, filed within 10 days and decided within 20 (silence means rejection), and its filing suspends execution; alternatively the party may go directly to the Tribunal de Cuentas within 18 days of notification. Agreements declared restrictive by a final CONACOM resolution are void, and nullity and damages actions in the civil courts require such a final resolution; CONACOM can report to the court on damages. Infringements and the related nullity and damages actions prescribe in 4 years from the conduct, or from when continuing conduct ends, interrupted by CONACOM acts notified to the party.
Cost to do it: Court fees and counsel for the Tribunal de Cuentas action; no CONACOM appeal fee.
Example: A sanctioned company notified on 1 March has 10 business days to seek reconsideration or 18 business days to sue before the Tribunal de Cuentas. / A customer overcharged by a cartel must wait for a final CONACOM resolution before suing for damages, and must act within the 4 year limit.Ley Nº 4956/2013, art. 64, 65, 67 and 68, Ley 4956 art. 64, 65, 67, 68, 2013-05-29 official text · verified 2026-10-28

7. Public procurement and guidance. Public buyers must design tender rules that respect competition and report suspected bid rigging to CONACOM; when CONACOM finds an infringement it asks the Dirección Nacional de Contrataciones Públicas to register the offenders as barred from contracting with the state. CONACOM has issued guidance on compliance programmes (Res. D/AD 2022/092), on collusion in public procurement (Res. D/AD 2022/089) and on good competition practices for trade associations (Res. D/AD 2020/079).
Cost to do it: Internal compliance programme cost, not priced by law.
Example: A construction firm found to have rigged a municipal tender can be barred from public contracts in addition to the CONACOM fine. / For bidders on public works and PPP projects, a competition compliance programme aligned with CONACOM's 2022 guide is a practical defence of reputation, though the law grants no formal fine reduction for it.Decreto Nº 1490/2014, art. 7; CONACOM Resoluciones D/AD 2020/079, 2022/089 and 2022/092, Decreto 1490 art. 7, 2022-10-05 official text · verified 2026-10-28

Stage	Term	Note
Investigation	90, extendable once by 90	Report proposing dismissal or charges
Defence	18	Answer to charges
Evidence	Up to 40	On request of the accused
Closing briefs	15 each side	Investigation director and accused
Decision	40	Silence means acquittal
Reconsideration	10 to file, 20 to decide	Suspends execution
Tribunal de Cuentas	18 to file	Alternative to reconsideration

Contested CONACOM case, statutory terms (business days, Ley 4956 art. 38 and 50 to 59)

Worked example

Price fixing: four wholesalers of a building material agree a common price list. CONACOM opens a case ex officio. Each company's sales of that material in the affected market over the 12 months before the case opened are PYG 20,000,000,000 (about US$3,408,136); the ceiling per company is PYG 4,000,000,000 (about US$681,627), and the fine cannot be lower than the advantage each obtained if it can be quantified.
Settlement: one wholesaler offers a cease commitment with a daily fine of PYG 5,000,000 for any breach and quarterly reports; the board approves it, suspending that company's case without any admission, while the case continues against the others.

Step by step

Map contacts with competitors (trade associations, joint purchasing, bids) and stop any exchange of prices, margins, capacity or bid intentions.
Adopt a written competition compliance programme following CONACOM's 2022 guide and train sales staff and managers, who can be personally within the law's scope (art. 3 num. 3).
If you hold a strong market position, review rebates, exclusivity, tying, refusals to supply and below cost pricing against art. 9 to 11.
On receiving a CONACOM information request, answer within the term set (up to 10 days, extendable once) to avoid cooperation fines that double on repeat.
If charged, diary the 18 business day defence deadline and request the 40 day evidence period in the same filing; consider a cease commitment early.
After a sanction, choose between reconsideration (10 business days, suspends execution) and a direct Tribunal de Cuentas action (18 business days).

Common traps

Consciously parallel conduct can be enough; the law does not require a written or formal agreement (art. 8).
There is no leniency programme, so self reporting a cartel brings no statutory immunity; the cease commitment is the main negotiated exit.
The 20 percent cap is measured on sales in the affected market over the 12 months before the proceeding opened, not on the duration of the cartel.
Control links matter: a parent can answer for its subsidiary's conduct (art. 5), and foreign conduct with Paraguayan effects is covered (art. 3).
Bid rigging findings can also lead to exclusion from public procurement through the DNCP register (Decreto 1490 art. 7).
If the board does not decide within 40 business days after closing briefs, the accused is acquitted (art. 59), so complainants should watch deadlines.

Sources

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