Countries › Peru › Guide › 13. Regulation › Cartels, abuse of dominance and competition fines in Peru: what is banned outright, leniency, prison for cartels and how fines are set

Cartels, abuse of dominance and competition fines in Peru: what is banned outright, leniency, prison for cartels and how fines are set

Last verified: 2026-10-28 · Status: Changing

Price fixing, output limits, market sharing and bid rigging between competitors are banned outright in Peru: INDECOPI only has to prove the agreement, not its effects. Abuse of dominance and vertical restraints are judged on their effects. Fines reach 500, 1,000 or more than 1,000 UIT (above S/ 5.5 million), capped at 8, 10 or 12 percent of the group's sales, plus up to 100 UIT for each director or manager involved. Since 2023 cartel participants also face two to six years in prison. The first leniency applicant who brings evidence is fully exempt, from the fine and from criminal liability; later applicants get 20 to 50 percent off. A cease commitment can close an investigation early, and INDECOPI is consulting on guidelines for it until December 2026.

USD figures use S/ 3.452 per US dollar, the banking system selling rate published by the Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP for 27 October 2026, from the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú statistics series PD04640PD. UIT based amounts use the 2026 UIT of S/ 5,500 set by Decreto Supremo Nº 301-2025-EF, as listed in the SUNAT UIT table. Fines expressed in UIT are paid at the UIT in force on the payment date. Conversions are for orientation only.

Key facts

Hard core cartels (price fixing, output limits, market sharing, bid rigging) banned per se	Yes TUO DL Nº 1034 art. 11.2, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Cartel participation is a crime	2 to 6 years in prisonCódigo Penal art. 232 as amended by Ley Nº 31775, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Maximum competition fine, very serious infringement, share of group sales	12 %TUO DL Nº 1034 art. 46.1 c), as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Maximum fine on each director or manager involved	100 UITTUO DL Nº 1034 art. 46.3, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
First leniency applicant	Full exemption TUO DL Nº 1034 art. 26.3, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Second leniency applicant, fine reduction	30 to 50 %TUO DL Nº 1034 art. 26.3 a), as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Limitation period for competition infringements	5 yearsTUO DL Nº 1034 art. 45, as of 2026-10-28 · in force
Fee for a complaint on anticompetitive conduct	778.80 PENTUPA INDECOPI procedure PA1400BB5B, as of 2026-10-28 · in force

The rule

1. The competition law applies to any natural or legal person, irregular company or public or private entity that offers or demands goods or services, with or without profit, including those who direct or manage them, and to people who, without competing in the market, act as planners, intermediaries or facilitators of a per se infringement, including public officials acting outside their duties. It reaches conduct with actual or potential anticompetitive effects in Peru even if it originated abroad. Conduct that is the consequence of a legal norm is outside its scope.
Cost to do it: No fee; compliance programs and competition audits are private costs.
Example: A trade consultancy in Lima that organises meetings where cement distributors agree prices can be sanctioned as a facilitator under art. 2.4 even though it does not sell cement. / A price agreement made at a meeting in Miami between suppliers to Peruvian buyers is caught if it affects the Peruvian market (art. 4).Texto Único Ordenado del Decreto Legislativo Nº 1034, Ley de Represión de Conductas Anticompetitivas, approved by Decreto Supremo Nº 111-2024-PCM (12 October 2024), Art. 2.1 to 2.4, art. 3 and art. 4, 2024-10-12 official text · verified 2026-10-28

2. Horizontal agreements, decisions, recommendations or concerted practices between competitors that have the object or effect of restricting competition are prohibited. Inter brand agreements that are not complementary or ancillary to other lawful agreements and whose object is to fix prices or other commercial conditions, limit production or sales (in particular through quotas), share customers, suppliers or territories, or set bids or abstentions in tenders, public procurement or auctions, are absolutely prohibited: INDECOPI only has to prove that the conduct took place. Other horizontal practices, such as discrimination, tying, concerted refusals to deal or concerted exclusion of competitors, are relatively prohibited and require proof of actual or potential negative effects on competition and consumer welfare.
Cost to do it: Defence costs aside, the exposure is the fine scale of art. 46, the criminal offence of art. 232 of the Código Penal and civil damages.
Example: Two Arequipa bakeries agreeing a common bread price commit a per se infringement; that the agreed price was low or the market small is irrelevant to liability, though it matters for the fine. / The same rule applies to a joint bid by two foreign engineering firms for a Peruvian public tender that hides a bid rotation scheme.TUO del DL Nº 1034 (DS Nº 111-2024-PCM); numeral 11.2 as amended by Decreto Legislativo Nº 1205, Art. 8, art. 9, art. 11.1, art. 11.2 and art. 11.3, 2024-10-12 official text · verified 2026-10-28

3. Abuse of a dominant position is using that position to unduly restrict competition and obtain benefits that would not have been possible without it, harming actual or potential competitors. It covers exclusionary conduct such as unjustified refusals to deal, discriminatory conditions (discounts and bonuses that follow accepted commercial practice are allowed), tying, obstructing a competitor's entry into an association, unjustified exclusive distribution or non compete clauses, abusive and repeated litigation, and inducing third parties not to supply. Vertical agreements between parties at different levels of the chain are only unlawful if at least one party already has dominance in the relevant market. Both abuse and vertical restraints are relative prohibitions judged on their effects, and merely holding dominance is not an infringement.
Cost to do it: Effects analysis requires economic evidence on market definition and foreclosure; budget for economists in any investigation.
Example: A supplier with no dominance can impose exclusive distribution on its Lima retailers; the same clause from a dominant supplier is reviewed on its effects under art. 10.2 e) and 12.3. / Same analysis for a foreign brand owner with a dominant Peruvian distribution network.TUO del DL Nº 1034 (DS Nº 111-2024-PCM), Art. 10.1 to 10.5 and art. 12.1 to 12.4, 2024-10-12 official text · verified 2026-10-28

4. Fines are set in UIT: minor infringements up to 500 UIT, serious up to 1,000 UIT and very serious above 1,000 UIT, without exceeding 8, 10 and 12 percent respectively of the offender's or its economic group's total sales or gross income in the year before the decision. Trade associations, professional bodies and agents that started operating after 1 January of the previous year face at most 1,000 UIT. Legal representatives and members of management or governing bodies who took part can be fined up to 100 UIT each. Repeat offending is an aggravating factor, the UIT is the one in force on the payment date, and the fine is reduced by 15 percent if paid before the appeal deadline without appealing. Obstruction, false information or destroying documents can be fined up to 1,000 UIT within 10 percent of sales. Fines are graded on the expected illicit benefit, probability of detection, scope, market size, market share, effects, duration, repeat offending and procedural conduct.
Cost to do it: A very serious cartel fine can exceed S/ 5,500,000, within 12 percent of group sales; up to S/ 550,000 per individual manager.
Example: A group with S/ 200 million of sales found in a very serious cartel faces up to 12 percent, S/ 24,000,000; paying within the appeal period without appealing saves 15 percent. / About US$6.95 million for that group, and up to US$159,328 for each manager involved.TUO del DL Nº 1034 (DS Nº 111-2024-PCM), Art. 46.1 to 46.7 and art. 47, 2024-10-12 official text · verified 2026-10-28

5. Before a sanction procedure starts, anyone can ask the Technical Secretariat for exemption from fines in exchange for evidence of a cartel and its participants. The first applicant to provide evidence obtains full exemption if it keeps cooperating; the Secretariat grants a marker, with up to 30 business days to complete the information. The second applicant can obtain a 30 to 50 percent reduction, the third 20 to 30 percent and later ones up to 20 percent, if their evidence adds significant value. An applicant that coerced others into the cartel cannot obtain full exemption, only a reduction. Separately, an investigated party can offer a cease commitment to close the case early; breaching an approved commitment is a serious infringement fined up to 1,000 UIT within 10 percent of sales.
Cost to do it: No fee. The cost is full cooperation and disclosure, and the business implications of admitting the conduct.
Example: The second company to come forward in a tender rigging cartel, with documents that add significant value, can see a fine of S/ 3 million reduced by 30 to 50 percent, to between S/ 1.5 million and S/ 2.1 million. / In dollars, roughly US$435,000 to US$608,000 instead of about US$869,000.TUO del DL Nº 1034 (DS Nº 111-2024-PCM), Art. 25.7 and art. 26.1 to 26.5, 2024-10-12 official text · verified 2026-10-28

6. Taking part in an agreement or practice that is absolutely prohibited under the competition law, aimed at preventing, restricting or distorting competition, is the crime of abuse of economic power, punished with two to six years in prison, 180 to 365 day fines and disqualification. INDECOPI and OSIPTEL must send any final resolution finding such a cartel to the public prosecutor within 5 business days, and the prosecutor opens a criminal investigation. Whoever obtained full exemption under the leniency program is exempt from criminal liability, and an identity kept confidential in the administrative procedure stays confidential in the criminal one.
Cost to do it: Individual criminal defence costs; the exposure is personal, so managers need separate counsel.
Example: A sales manager who joined a price fixing cartel that INDECOPI finally sanctioned can be prosecuted under art. 232; a manager of the first leniency applicant is covered by its criminal exemption. / For foreign groups, local managers in Peru carry personal criminal risk even when the fine is paid by the company.Ley Nº 31775, which amends art. 232 of the Código Penal and art. 36 of DL Nº 1034 (El Peruano, 7 June 2023), Art. 1 (Código Penal art. 232), art. 2 (DL Nº 1034 art. 36.4), First and Second Final Complementary Provisions, 2023-06-07 official text · verified 2026-10-28 · changed: Ley Nº 31775 (7 June 2023) replaced the 2020 text of art. 232 of the Código Penal with a cartel offence tied to the per se prohibitions and created the criminal exemption for full leniency.

7. Investigations are opened ex officio by the Technical Secretariat or on a complaint. INDECOPI's procedures text charges S/ 778.80 for a sanction procedure on anticompetitive conduct started by a party's complaint, with a processing term of 330 business days from the start resolution, or 385 if a second oral hearing is called, and negative administrative silence. Infringements lapse five years after the last act, with the period interrupted by any notified investigative act. Final Tribunal decisions end the administrative route and can only be challenged in the contentious administrative courts.
Cost to do it: Complaint fee S/ 778.80 (about US$226); expert and legal fees are the real cost of a case lasting over a year.
Example: A distributor complaining of a dominant supplier's refusal to deal pays S/ 778.80 and should expect up to 330 business days to a first instance decision. / About US$226 to file.TUPA del INDECOPI (DS Nº 088-2025-PCM, consolidated with Res. Nº 000047-2026-PRE/INDECOPI of 13 May 2026); TUO del DL Nº 1034, TUPA procedure PA1400BB5B; art. 44 and art. 45 of the TUO, 2026-05-13 official text · verified 2026-10-28

8. INDECOPI published draft guidelines on cease commitments on 16 September 2026, setting criteria for accepting proposals, the measures that can be offered for each type of conduct and their interaction with leniency, with comments open until 11 December 2026 before final approval. Until the guidelines are approved, cease commitments follow art. 25 of the TUO as they stand.
Cost to do it: No fee to comment.
Example: A company under investigation in 2027 could use the final guidelines to frame a cease commitment offer. / Foreign groups used to settlement mechanisms elsewhere should watch for the final text before relying on it.INDECOPI press release of 16 September 2026 on the draft Lineamientos sobre compromisos de cese, Draft guidelines under art. 25 of the TUO del DL Nº 1034, 2026-09-16 official text · verified 2026-10-28

Category	Fine cap	Sales cap	S/ at 2026 UIT
Minor	500 UIT	8 percent	S/ 2,750,000
Serious	1,000 UIT	10 percent	S/ 5,500,000
Very serious	Above 1,000 UIT	12 percent	Above S/ 5,500,000
Each manager or director	100 UIT	None stated	S/ 550,000
Associations and new entrants	1,000 UIT maximum	As above	S/ 5,500,000

Competition fines under art. 46 of the TUO of DL Nº 1034 (DS Nº 111-2024-PCM).

Leniency rank	Benefit	Source
First with evidence	Full exemption from fine; criminal exemption under Ley Nº 31775	TUO art. 26.3; Ley Nº 31775 First Final Provision
Second	30 to 50 percent reduction	TUO art. 26.3 a)
Third	20 to 30 percent reduction	TUO art. 26.3 b)
Later	Up to 20 percent reduction	TUO art. 26.3 c)
Coercer	Reduction only, no exemption	TUO art. 26.5

Peru's leniency program.

Worked example

Three importers of steel bars agree minimum prices for Peru. INDECOPI proves the meetings and emails, which is enough under art. 11.2. As a very serious infringement each company faces more than 1,000 UIT (S/ 5,500,000, about US$1.59 million) within 12 percent of its group's sales, each participating manager up to 100 UIT, and after a final resolution INDECOPI sends the file to the prosecutor under art. 232 of the Código Penal. Had one importer applied first for leniency with evidence, it would have paid nothing and its managers would be exempt from criminal liability.

Step by step

Adopt a competition policy: no contact with competitors on prices, volumes, customers, territories or bids; record legitimate trade association meetings with agendas and minutes.
Review distribution contracts for exclusivity, non competes and resale price clauses if the company may hold dominance in any Peruvian market.
Train sales and procurement teams on the criminal risk under art. 232 and on dawn raid protocols.
If a cartel is found internally, assess a leniency application quickly: only the first applicant gets full exemption.
If investigated, consider a cease commitment early and track the final cease commitment guidelines.
Budget for long procedures: 330 business days at first instance, then appeal to the Tribunal and the courts.

Common traps

Bid rigging in public tenders is a per se infringement and also exposes managers to prison.
Facilitators such as consultants or associations can be fined even if they do not compete.
Fines are computed at the UIT on the payment date, so delays raise the soles amount when the UIT rises.
Information exchanges and recommendations by trade associations are covered as horizontal practices.
A coercer cannot get full leniency.
Leniency applications after the procedure has started only qualify for reductions.

Sources

← Merger control in Peru: when a deal needs INDECOPI clearance, the filing fee, the timetable and what gun jumping costsUnfair competition and advertising rules in Peru: deceptive claims, comparative ads, trade secrets, price display and INDECOPI fines →

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