Countries › Chile › Guide › 13. Regulation › Cartels, abuse of dominance and FNE investigations in Chile: conduct rules, fines, leniency and criminal collusion

Cartels, abuse of dominance and FNE investigations in Chile: conduct rules, fines, leniency and criminal collusion

Last verified: 2026-10-26 · Status: Stable

Any act that restricts free competition is sanctioned, with hard core cartels, abuse of a dominant position, predatory pricing and interlocking directorates between large competitors listed as examples. The TDLC can fine up to 30 percent of the affected sales, twice the benefit, or 60,000 UTA, bar cartel members from State contracts for five years and order companies dissolved. Price fixing, output limits, market sharing and bid rigging are also crimes for the individuals involved, and the first company to confess through leniency avoids the fine and its people avoid prosecution.

USD figures use the Central Bank exchange rate of CLP 986.58 per US dollar published in the Diario Oficial for 23 October 2026 (CVE 2891564). UF figures use the SII value of CLP 41,221.08 for 26 October 2026, and UTM and UTA figures the SII values of CLP 72,151 and CLP 865,812 for October 2026. Conversions are for orientation only.

Key facts

Maximum competition fine, share of sales in the affected line during the infringement	30 %DL Nº 211 art. 26 c), as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum competition fine, multiple of the economic benefit	2 timesDL Nº 211 art. 26 c), as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum competition fine when sales and benefit cannot be determined	60,000 UTADL Nº 211 art. 26 c), as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum ban on State contracts for cartel members	5 yearsDL Nº 211 art. 26 d), as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Hard core cartels are a crime for individuals	Yes textDL Nº 211 art. 62, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum fine reduction for the second leniency applicant	50 %DL Nº 211 art. 39 bis, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Prescription of cartel actions	5 yearsDL Nº 211 art. 20, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Prescription of other competition actions	3 yearsDL Nº 211 art. 20, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Group revenue above which interlocking directorates between competitors are banned	100,000 UFDL Nº 211 art. 3 d), as of 2026-10-26 · in force

The rule

1. Anyone who carries out or enters into any act or agreement that prevents, restricts or hinders free competition, or tends to do so, is sanctioned. The listed examples are agreements or concerted practices between competitors to fix sale or purchase prices, limit output, share zones or quotas, or affect the outcome of tenders (the hard core cartel); other agreements between competitors that give them market power to set commercial terms or exclude competitors; abusive exploitation of a dominant position, for example by fixing prices, tying sales, or allocating zones; predatory or unfair competition practices to reach, keep or increase dominance; and one person sitting as a relevant executive or director in two or more competing companies when each group has annual revenue above UF 100,000, if this continues 90 calendar days after the end of the year in which the threshold was passed.
Cost to do it: Antitrust compliance programmes are a private cost; there is no registration or fee.
Example: UF 100,000 is about CLP 4,122 million at the 26 October 2026 UF. / About US$4.2 million of annual group revenue triggers the interlocking directorate rule.DL Nº 211 of 1973 (consolidated by DFL Nº 1 of 2004), as amended by Ley Nº 20.945, Art. 3, 2016-08-30 official text · verified 2026-10-26

2. In its judgment the TDLC can modify or end the unlawful acts or contracts; order the modification or dissolution of the companies involved; and impose fines of up to 30 percent of the infringer's sales in the product line affected during the infringement, or up to twice the economic benefit obtained. If neither can be determined, the cap is 60,000 UTA. Fines can be imposed on the company, its directors, managers and anyone who took part. Fines on individuals cannot be paid by the company, its group or its shareholders, and directors and managers who took part are jointly liable for company fines. For cartels, the TDLC can also bar the company from contracting with the State and from State concessions for up to five years. The criteria include the benefit obtained, gravity, deterrence, repeat offending within ten years, economic capacity and cooperation with the FNE. The TDLC judgment can be appealed only to the Supreme Court within 10 business days; the appeal does not suspend the judgment except for payment of fines.
Cost to do it: Fine cap where sales and benefit cannot be determined: 60,000 UTA, about CLP 51,949 million or US$52.7 million.
Example: A cartel that ran for three years in a product line with CLP 50,000 million of sales a year exposes the company to up to 30 percent of CLP 150,000 million, that is CLP 45,000 million. / About US$45.6 million in that example, plus damages claims before the TDLC.DL Nº 211, Art. 26 and art. 27, 2016-08-30 official text · verified 2026-10-26

3. Actions prescribe three years after the conduct, but cartel actions prescribe after five years, and the period does not start while the effects of the cartel remain in the market. Fines prescribe two years after the judgment is final. Follow on damages actions are brought before the TDLC itself in summary proceedings once its judgment is final, and prescribe four years after that judgment.
Cost to do it: Damages claims are a separate liability on top of fines; litigation costs are private.
Example: A distributor overcharged CLP 800 million by a cartel can sue before the TDLC within four years of the final cartel judgment. / About US$811,000 in that example.DL Nº 211, Art. 20 and art. 30, 2016-08-30 official text · verified 2026-10-26

4. The FNE investigates on its own initiative or on complaints. It can require information from companies and individuals, who can ask the TDLC to set aside requests that harm their interests within five days; not answering, or answering partly, is fined up to 2 UTA a day of delay, and not appearing to testify is fined 1 UTM to 1 UTA. Hiding information or giving false information to the FNE is a crime punished with presidio menor en sus grados mínimo a medio. In serious cartel cases, with TDLC approval and authorisation from a Santiago Court of Appeals judge, the FNE can have the police enter and search premises, seize documents, and intercept communications, but not communications with the target's lawyer. The FNE can also settle with companies under investigation; the TDLC approves or rejects the settlement within 15 business days of a hearing.
Cost to do it: Fine for late answers to FNE requests: up to 2 UTA a day, about CLP 1.73 million or US$1,755 a day.
Example: Ignoring an FNE information request for 30 days can cost up to 60 UTA, about CLP 51.9 million. / About US$52,700 for 30 days of delay.DL Nº 211, Art. 39 a), h), j), n) and ñ), art. 39 ter, art. 41 and art. 42, 2016-08-30 official text · verified 2026-10-26

5. Leniency: a cartel participant that gives the FNE precise, truthful and verifiable evidence that contributes to proving the cartel, keeps the application confidential and ends its participation immediately can obtain benefits. The first applicant is exempt from dissolution and from the fine. The second applicant can obtain a reduction of at most 50 percent of the fine the FNE would otherwise have sought. The benefits do not cover damages. A coercing organiser loses them. For a listed company, the application is material information that can be kept as reserved information under securities law.
Cost to do it: No fee. The benefit is a full exemption for the first applicant and up to 50 percent off for the second.
Example: If the FNE would seek CLP 10,000 million, the first applicant pays nothing and the second at most CLP 5,000 million. / About US$10.1 million and US$5.1 million in that example.DL Nº 211, Art. 39 bis, 2016-08-30 official text · verified 2026-10-26

6. Whoever enters into, orders, carries out or organises an agreement between competitors to fix sale or purchase prices, limit output or supply, share zones or market quotas, or affect the outcome of tenders run by public bodies, public service companies or State firms commits a crime punished with presidio menor en su grado máximo to presidio mayor en su grado mínimo. Prosecution can only start on a criminal complaint filed by the FNE after the TDLC has established the cartel in a final judgment, and the FNE must decide within six months whether to file. The first leniency applicant's people are exempt from criminal liability if they repeat their evidence and testify, and later applicants get a reduced sentence. The criminal action prescribes ten years after the TDLC judgment. Under Ley Nº 21.595, while the law does not coordinate the overlapping sanctions, companies themselves are not criminally liable for the collusion crime; they face the TDLC fines instead.
Cost to do it: Criminal exposure is personal; individual fines cannot be paid by the company (art. 26 c).
Example: A sales manager who agreed bid prices with a competitor in a hospital tender faces TDLC fines and, after the TDLC judgment, criminal prosecution on an FNE complaint. / Same in USD terms; the penalty is imprisonment, not a fixed amount.DL Nº 211 Title V, as amended by Ley Nº 21.595; Ley Nº 21.595 art. 59 and art. 65, DL Nº 211 art. 62, art. 63, art. 64 and art. 65; Ley Nº 21.595 art. 65, 2023-08-17 official text · verified 2026-10-26 · changed: Ley Nº 21.595 (DO 17 August 2023) repealed the second to fourth paragraphs of art. 62 and rewrote the leniency reduction in art. 63, and its art. 65 keeps companies outside criminal liability for collusion until the law coordinates both regimes.

Conduct	Main sanction	Approximate CLP	Approximate USD
Any anticompetitive conduct (art. 3)	Up to 30% of affected sales, 2x benefit, or 60,000 UTA	Up to CLP 51,949 million on the UTA cap	Up to US$52.7 million on the UTA cap
Hard core cartel (art. 3 a)	Above plus State contract ban up to 5 years and dissolution; crime for individuals (art. 62)	Same caps	Same caps
Not answering an FNE request (art. 39 h)	Up to 2 UTA a day	About CLP 1.73 million a day	About US$1,755 a day
Not appearing to testify (art. 39 j)	1 UTM to 1 UTA	CLP 72,151 to CLP 865,812	US$73 to US$878

Competition sanctions at a glance (DL Nº 211; CLP and USD at October 2026 values)

Worked example

Two Chilean suppliers of industrial gases agree to split customers. The FNE opens an investigation. One supplier applies for leniency first and ends its participation; the other is fined. If the TDLC finds the cartel lasted four years on CLP 30,000 million of yearly sales, the cap is 30 percent of CLP 120,000 million, that is CLP 36,000 million (about US$36.5 million), and the second firm can also be barred from public tenders for up to five years (DL Nº 211 art. 26).
After the judgment is final, the FNE decides within six months whether to file a criminal complaint against the managers of the non leniency firm; the leniency applicant's managers are exempt if they testify (art. 63 and 64).

Step by step

1. Map contacts with competitors (trade associations, benchmarking, joint bids) and set rules for what can be discussed.
2. Check every director and senior executive against the competitor boards rule if your group has revenue above UF 100,000 (art. 3 d).
3. If you hold or plan more than 10 percent of a competitor, report it to the FNE within 60 days of closing where both have revenue above UF 100,000 (art. 4 bis).
4. Set a dawn raid and information request protocol; FNE requests have short deadlines and daily fines.
5. If you find a cartel inside the company, take advice immediately on leniency: only the first applicant gets full immunity (art. 39 bis).

Common traps

Paying an executive's fine: fines on individuals cannot be paid by the company, its group or its shareholders (DL Nº 211 art. 26 c).
Thinking a cartel is old enough to be safe: the five year period does not run while its effects remain in the market (art. 20).
Ignoring follow on claims: leniency does not protect against damages (art. 39 bis).
Telling the market or the other members about a leniency application: confidentiality is a condition of the benefit (art. 39 bis Nº 2).
Assuming emails with in house lawyers are protected: the interception ban covers communications with the lawyer of the person investigated, not business discussions copied to counsel (art. 39 n).

Sources

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