Countries › Chile › Guide › 13. Regulation › Corporate criminal liability in Chile: Ley Nº 20.393 after the Economic Crimes Law, crime prevention models and day fines

Corporate criminal liability in Chile: Ley Nº 20.393 after the Economic Crimes Law, crime prevention models and day fines

Last verified: 2026-10-26 · Status: Stable

Since 1 September 2024, companies are criminally liable for hundreds of economic crimes, from bribery and tax fraud to environmental and money laundering offences, when they lack an effective crime prevention model. The defence is a model that maps risks, sets protocols with whistleblowing channels and sanctions written into every employment and service contract, has an independent compliance officer and is evaluated by independent third parties. A fine is always imposed, from 2 to 400 day fines worth 5 to 5,000 UTM each, and courts can add State contract bans, loss of tax benefits, supervision, forfeiture and, for crimes, dissolution.

USD figures use the Central Bank exchange rate of CLP 986.58 per US dollar published in the Diario Oficial for 23 October 2026 (CVE 2891564). UF figures use the SII value of CLP 41,221.08 for 26 October 2026, and UTM and UTA figures the SII values of CLP 72,151 and CLP 865,812 for October 2026. Conversions are for orientation only.

Key facts

Companies criminally liable	Yes textLey Nº 20.393 art. 1 to 3, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Current corporate criminal liability regime in force	2024-09-01 dateLey Nº 21.595 art. 60 Nº 1, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Effective compliance programme is a defence	Yes textLey Nº 20.393 art. 3 and 4, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Value of one corporate day fine, minimum	5 UTMLey Nº 20.393 art. 12, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Value of one corporate day fine, maximum	5,000 UTMLey Nº 20.393 art. 12, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum number of corporate day fines	400 daysLey Nº 20.393 art. 12, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum day fines when several fines combine	600 daysLey Nº 20.393 art. 12, as of 2026-10-26 · in force

The rule

1. The law covers private legal entities, State companies created by law, State companies, corporations and universities, political parties and religious legal entities. They answer for the crimes in arts. 1 to 4 of the Economic Crimes Law, whether or not treated as economic crimes in the case, and for terrorist financing, arms control offences, human trafficking and certain timber theft offences. The economic crimes list includes, among others, securities and banking crimes, foreign bribery and private corruption (Código Penal art. 251 bis, 287 bis and 287 ter), domestic bribery when committed in or for a company, tax crimes, customs fraud, environmental crimes (Código Penal art. 305 to 311), and money laundering.
Cost to do it: No registration or fee. Exposure depends on the crime list, not on company size.
Example: A Chilean subsidiary whose logistics manager bribes a customs official to clear goods faster is exposed both for the bribery (Código Penal art. 250) and for any customs fraud. / Same exposure in USD terms; the fine scale is set in UTM.Ley Nº 20.393 as replaced by Ley Nº 21.595 art. 50; Ley Nº 21.595, Ley de Delitos Económicos, Ley Nº 20.393 art. 1 and art. 2; Ley Nº 21.595 art. 1 to art. 4, 2023-08-17 official text · verified 2026-10-26 · changed: Ley Nº 21.595 (DO 17 August 2023) replaced the short crime list and the old liability test of Ley Nº 20.393 with the current regime from 1 September 2024 (Ley Nº 21.595 art. 60 Nº 1).

2. A company is liable for a listed crime committed within its activity by, or with the involvement of, any person holding a position, role or post in it, or providing services managing its affairs with third parties, with or without representation, when the crime was favoured or facilitated by the lack of effective implementation of an adequate prevention model. The same applies to crimes by people linked to another company that provides such services to it or lacks operational autonomy from it, where there are ownership links. There is no liability when the crime is committed only against the company itself. The company can be convicted even if no individual is convicted or identified, as long as the crime could only have been committed by such a person.
Cost to do it: No fee; agents, distributors and service providers acting for the company are within scope, so third party due diligence is part of the cost.
Example: A customs broker paid to clear the company's imports who bribes an official brings the risk inside the importer, because it manages the importer's affairs before third parties. / Same in USD terms.Ley Nº 20.393 as replaced by Ley Nº 21.595, Art. 3 and art. 5, 2023-08-17 official text · verified 2026-10-26

3. A prevention model is adequate, and exempts the company, when, in proportion to its purpose, business, size, complexity, resources and activities, it seriously and reasonably covers: identification of the activities or processes that carry crime risk; protocols and procedures to prevent and detect crimes in those activities, which must include secure whistleblowing channels and internal sanctions, be communicated to all workers and be written into the employment and service contracts of all workers and service providers, including top executives; one or more responsible persons with adequate independence, real powers of direction and supervision and direct access to management, with resources suited to the company's size; and periodic evaluation by independent third parties with improvement mechanisms. Mitigating factors include reporting the crime before knowing of proceedings, substantial cooperation, and adopting effective measures before formal charges; a conviction in the previous ten years aggravates.
Cost to do it: The model is a private cost: risk assessment, policies, a compliance officer, a hotline, training, contract amendments and periodic independent review.
Example: A 200 employee mining services company appoints a compliance officer reporting to the board, adds model clauses to all 200 employment contracts and its main service contracts, and hires an outside firm to evaluate the model every two years. / The law sets no fixed frequency for the independent evaluation; it must be periodic and lead to improvements.Ley Nº 20.393 as replaced by Ley Nº 21.595, Art. 4, art. 6 and art. 7, 2023-08-17 official text · verified 2026-10-26

4. Penalties are dissolution; a bar on contracting with the State; loss of tax benefits and a ban on receiving them; court supervision; a fine; forfeiture of the proceeds; and publication of a summary of the judgment in the Diario Oficial and a national newspaper, which is always imposed. A fine is always imposed: day fines, each worth 5 to 5,000 UTM, from 2 to 400 days, and never more than 600 days in total. For crimes the fine is at least 200 day fines, and for lesser offences at most 200. Where the profits were distributed to shareholders who did not know their origin, the law can allow a fine of up to 30 percent of the sales of the line concerned or twice the profit if higher. Fines paid under other laws for the same facts are credited. Penalties survive mergers, transformations and asset transfers.
Cost to do it: Maximum ordinary fine 400 x 5,000 UTM = 2,000,000 UTM (about CLP 144,302 million or US$146.3 million); minimum 2 x 5 UTM = 10 UTM (about CLP 721,510 or US$731).
Example: A crime level case with 200 day fines at 1,000 UTM each gives 200,000 UTM, about CLP 14,430 million. / About US$14.6 million in that example.Ley Nº 20.393 as replaced by Ley Nº 21.595, Art. 8, art. 10, art. 12, art. 13, art. 14, art. 15, art. 18 and art. 18 bis, 2023-08-17 official text · verified 2026-10-26

5. Companies are not criminally liable for the collusion crime of DL Nº 211 art. 62 until the law coordinates the overlap between TDLC sanctions and criminal penalties; cartels are punished through the TDLC regime. Facts committed before the Economic Crimes Law took effect are judged under the law in force when they occurred.
Cost to do it: No fee.
Example: A price fixing cartel exposes the company to TDLC fines of up to 30 percent of affected sales, not to Ley Nº 20.393 day fines. / Same in USD terms.Ley Nº 21.595, Art. 65 and art. 66, 2023-08-17 official text · verified 2026-10-26

Offence level	Fine range	Other penalties available
Crime (crimen)	At least 200 day fines, up to 400 (each 5 to 5,000 UTM); up to about CLP 144,302 million or US$146.3 million	Dissolution in listed cases, loss of tax benefits for at least 3 years, State contract ban, supervision, forfeiture, publication
Lesser offence (simple delito)	Up to 200 day fines (each 5 to 5,000 UTM); up to about CLP 72,151 million or US$73.1 million	Loss of tax benefits up to 3 years, State contract ban, supervision, forfeiture, publication

Corporate penalties under Ley Nº 20.393 art. 14 (CLP and USD at October 2026 UTM and exchange rate)

Worked example

A foreign owned construction company's site manager pays a municipal official to speed up a permit. The company had a policy manual but no clauses in contracts, no independent compliance officer and no outside review. It is exposed under Ley Nº 20.393 art. 3 because the bribe was facilitated by the lack of an effectively implemented model, and the court must impose a fine and publication, and may bar it from State contracts.
Had it implemented and independently evaluated a model meeting art. 4, it would have a defence even though the manager is prosecuted personally.

Step by step

1. Run a crime risk assessment by process (permits, customs, tax, procurement, environment, sales to State bodies).
2. Adopt protocols, a secure whistleblowing channel and internal sanctions, and add them to every employment and service contract.
3. Appoint an independent compliance officer with resources and direct access to the board.
4. Extend due diligence and contract clauses to agents, brokers and distributors that deal with third parties for the company.
5. Commission a periodic independent evaluation and record the improvements made.
6. If a crime is found, consider reporting it before proceedings start, which is a mitigating factor (art. 6).

Common traps

A paper model: the law requires effective implementation, independent evaluation and contract clauses (art. 3 and 4).
Ignoring intermediaries: people who manage the company's affairs with third parties trigger liability (art. 3).
Assuming a merger cleans the slate: penalties follow the company through transformation, merger or asset transfer (art. 18 and 18 bis).
Using a group compliance programme without a local adaptation: adequacy is judged against the Chilean entity's own activities and size (art. 4).

Sources

← Personal data protection in Chile: Ley Nº 21.719 from 1 December 2026, legal bases, rights, breaches, transfers and finesBribery, private corruption and lobbying rules in Chile: domestic and foreign bribery, gifts, and the Lobby Law →