Countries › Dominican Republic › Guide › 13. Regulation › Abuse of a dominant position

Abuse of a dominant position

Last verified: 2026-10-30 · Status: Stable

Being dominant is lawful in the Dominican Republic; abusing it is not. Ley 42-08 lists exclusive dealing, resale price imposition, tying, refusal to deal and discrimination. Each case turns on net effects, so an efficiency defense is built into the law, and fines run from 30 to 3,000 minimum salaries.

USD figures use the Banco Central de la República Dominicana reference selling rate of RD$60.9007 per US dollar, as shown on its home page on 30 October 2026, rounded to the cent.

Key facts

Statutory market share presumption of dominance	None textLey 42-08 art. 9, as of 2026-10-30 · in force
Maximum fine for abuse	3000 minimum salariesLey 42-08 art. 61 literal c, as of 2026-10-30 · in force

The rule

1. A dominant position is control of the relevant market that gives power to hinder effective competition or to act independently of competitors, customers or consumers. Holding or increasing it is not itself a breach.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 4 and art. 7 paragraph IV, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

2. Conduct is banned when it abuses dominance in a relevant market and can create unjustified barriers for third parties.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 6, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

3. The list covers: making a sale depend on not buying from rivals; imposing prices and terms on resellers without commercial reason; tying; selling on condition of not dealing with a third party; refusing to sell what is normally available when no alternative supplier exists; and unequal terms for equivalent deals without commercial reason.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 6 literals a to f, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

4. A refusal to deal is justified where the customer breached contract, or its history shows high returns, damaged goods, non payment or a similar commercial reason.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 6 literal e, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

5. Abuse cases weigh net effect: whether anticompetitive effects exceed pro competitive or efficiency effects. The party seeking the sanction proves harm and the company proves efficiencies.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 7 numeral 2 and paragraph I, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

6. The relevant market turns on the product, the geographic area, substitution for the consumer, distribution cost including freight and tariffs, supply side substitution, and regulatory limits.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 8, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

7. Dominance turns on entry barriers, market share and unilateral price power, rivals' shares, access to inputs, and recent competitive behavior. The law sets no share threshold.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 9, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

8. Fines for abuse run from 30 to 3,000 minimum salaries, under the same uplifts and void effects as for cartels.
Example: RD$899,640 to RD$89,964,000 at the large company tariff / US$14,772.24 to US$1,477,224.40Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 61 literal c and paragraphs II to VI, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

9. The State may not keep measures for public companies or delegated operators that create unjustified barriers or allow unfair competition. ProCompetencia reviews subsidies and aid and can recommend changing them, in a reasoned report.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 15 and paragraph, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

10. The general law applies to all agents, but only in a supplementary way to agents under sector laws with competition rules. Sector rules apply first and the Ley 42-08 fills gaps.Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 2 and art. 20 paragraph III, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30

Worked example

A large supplier ties two products and pays the top fine: 3,000 x RD$29,988 = RD$89,964,000 (US$1,477,224.40).
The same supplier repeats within the regime: an extra fine of up to double may be added, so up to RD$179,928,000 (US$2,954,448.80) more.

Step by step

Define your market with art. 8 factors, including imports, since freight and tariffs count.
If you lead a market, keep a written commercial reason for exclusivity, loyalty terms, tying and price differences.
Before cutting off a distributor, record the breach, returns or non payment that justifies it.
Check the sector regulator first in telecoms, power, finance and other regulated markets.
Keep efficiency evidence ready, since the burden on that point is yours.

Common traps

Resale price imposition is listed under abuse, so it needs dominance. It is not treated as a cartel unless competitors are involved.
Exclusive distribution is common and legal, but literal a catches it where the supplier is dominant.
There is no safe harbor share, so a company can be found dominant collectively with others.
Reform drafts rework the sanction regime, so review distribution terms once a bill appears. See regulation/merger-control-and-competition-reform.
Refusal to deal has a defense only for commercial reasons of a similar kind to those listed. Keep it specific.

Sources

← Cartels and agreements between competitorsMerger control and the competition reform →

Get rule changes weekly

Free. One email a week from The LatAm Thread.

One more step after you press the button: we take you to Substack, where your email is already filled in. Confirm there to start. No spam, unsubscribe anytime, we never share your address. By subscribing you agree to the privacy policy.