Countries › Dominican Republic › Guide › 13. Regulation › Cartels and agreements between competitors
Cartels and agreements between competitors
Last verified: 2026-10-30 · Status: Stable
Ley 42-08 bans agreements between competitors that fix prices, rig bids, share markets or limit output. Fines run from 30 to 3,000 minimum salaries, with a floor of 200 for bid rigging. On the top private tariff that is about US$1.48 million at most, so the money risk is modest by global standards, but the agreement is void and personal exposure exists.
USD figures use the Banco Central de la República Dominicana reference selling rate of RD$60.9007 per US dollar, as shown on its home page on 30 October 2026, rounded to the cent.
Key facts
| Minimum fine for cartels, in minimum salaries | 30 minimum salariesLey 42-08 art. 61, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
|---|---|
| Maximum fine for cartels and abuse, in minimum salaries | 3000 minimum salariesLey 42-08 art. 61, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
| Top fine at the large company tariff | 89964000 DOPLey 42-08 art. 61; Resolución CNS-01-2025, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
| Top fine at the large company tariff | 1477224.40 USDLey 42-08 art. 61; Resolución CNS-01-2025, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
| Minimum fine for bid rigging | 200 minimum salariesLey 42-08 art. 61 literal b, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
| Time limit for action after the conduct stops | 1 yearsLey 42-08 art. 56, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
| Individuals in a cartel can face criminal rules | Yes, by reference to the Código Procesal Penal; no specific prison term in the law textLey 42-08 art. 61 paragraph I, as of 2026-10-30 · in force |
The rule
Example: 30 x RD$29,988 = RD$899,640; 3,000 x RD$29,988 = RD$89,964,000 / US$14,772.24 to US$1,477,224.40Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 61 literal a, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30
Example: 200 x RD$29,988 = RD$5,997,600 / US$98,481.63Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia, art. 61 literal b, 2008-01-16 official text · verified 2026-10-30
| Conduct | Multiple | Large company | Micro company |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartel other than bid rigging, floor | 30 | RD$899,640 (US$14,772.24) | RD$509,796 (US$8,370.94) |
| Bid rigging, floor | 200 | RD$5,997,600 (US$98,481.63) | RD$3,398,640 (US$55,806.26) |
| Cartel, abuse, ceiling | 3,000 | RD$89,964,000 (US$1,477,224.40) | RD$50,979,600 (US$837,093.83) |
| False information, floor | 50 | RD$1,499,400 (US$24,620.41) | RD$849,660 (US$13,951.56) |
| False information, ceiling | 200 | RD$5,997,600 (US$98,481.63) | RD$3,398,640 (US$55,806.26) |
Fines under art. 61 at the 2026 private tariffs
Worked example
- Large company, cartel, top of range: 3,000 x RD$29,988 = RD$89,964,000 (US$1,477,224.40).
- Same conduct, small company: 3,000 x RD$18,421.20 = RD$55,263,600 (US$907,437.85).
- Bid rigging, large company, floor: 200 x RD$29,988 = RD$5,997,600 (US$98,481.63).
- Late payment on a RD$10,000,000 fine: 3% is RD$300,000 (US$4,926.05) for each month, on the original amount.
Step by step
- Map any contact with competitors, including trade association meetings, joint purchasing and price surveys.
- Stop sharing current or future prices, discounts or tender plans at once; information exchange with that object is listed conduct.
- Before a joint venture, write down the efficiency or investment goal, because art. 7 protects only ancillary restraints.
- If a cartel surfaces, take advice on leniency before anything else. See regulation/competition-investigations-and-leniency.
- Screen tender teams: ProCompetencia keeps a collusion section on its site with tools for buyers.
Common traps
- Bid rigging starts at 200 minimum salaries, nearly seven times the general floor.
- The fine base is the sector tariff, so a small company pays far less than a large one for the same conduct: 3,000 x RD$18,421.20 against 3,000 x RD$29,988.
- Fines do not scale with sales today. A fine that looks small is not the whole cost: the agreement is void and victims can sue for damages under art. 63.
- Art. 7 reads as needing proof of a dominant position even for a cartel, which is unusual. Do not plan around it, since the reform draft aims to harden cartel rules.
- The one year limit runs from when the conduct stops, so a long running practice stays exposed until it ends.
- Foreign conduct counts if it has effects in the country, so a regional allocation deal made abroad is in scope.
Sources
- Ley 42-08 General de Defensa de la Competencia
- Resolución CNS-01-2025, Comité Nacional de Salarios
- Política Nacional de Competencia, Decreto 196-25
Related pages
- regulation/abuse-of-dominance
- regulation/competition-investigations-and-leniency
- regulation/merger-control-and-competition-reform
- labor/minimum-wage
- investing/selling-to-the-state
- /country/dominican-republic/
- /calendar/
- Live dashboard
Related: Dominican Republic country profile · live dashboard · central bank and release calendar · our posts on X
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