Countries › Colombia › Guide › 13. Regulation › Competition law in Colombia: cartels, bid rigging, abuse of dominance, leniency and SIC fines

Competition law in Colombia: cartels, bid rigging, abuse of dominance, leniency and SIC fines

Last verified: 2026-10-27 · Status: Stable

Colombia prohibits agreements and practices that restrict competition, with a list of per se suspect agreements (price fixing, market sharing, quotas, bid rigging) and of abuses by dominant firms, enforced by the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (SIC) across all sectors. Companies face fines of up to 100,000 pre 2024 minimum wages (COP 140,476,000,000 in 2026, about US$44.5 million) or 150 percent of the profit from the conduct, and individuals up to 2,000, which employers may not pay or insure; bid rigging in public tenders is also a crime with 6 to 12 years in prison. A leniency program grants full immunity to the first cartel member to report before charges, 30 to 50 percent off for the second and up to 25 percent for the third, and investigations can end early if the company offers acceptable guarantees.

USD figures use the TRM (tasa representativa del mercado) of COP 3,157.94 per US dollar, valid 27 October 2026, from the official TRM series published by the Superintendencia Financiera on the national open data portal. Conversions are for orientation only.

Key facts

Maximum fixed competition fine per infringement for a company, 2026 pesos (11,600,000 UVB)	140476000000 COPLey 1340 de 2009 art. 25; Ley 2294 de 2023 art. 313, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Alternative competition fine cap as a share of profit from the conduct	150 %Ley 1340 de 2009 art. 25, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Maximum competition fine for an individual, 2026 pesos (232,000 UVB)	2809520000 COPLey 1340 de 2009 art. 26; Ley 2294 de 2023 art. 313, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Limitation period for competition sanctions	5 yearsLey 1340 de 2009 art. 27, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Fine reduction for the first leniency applicant before charges	100 %Decreto 1074 de 2015 art. 2.2.2.29.2.2 (Decreto 253 de 2022), as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Maximum fine reduction for the second leniency applicant before charges	50 %Decreto 1074 de 2015 art. 2.2.2.29.2.2 (Decreto 253 de 2022), as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Maximum prison term for bid rigging in public procurement	12 yearsCódigo Penal art. 410A (Ley 1474 de 2011 art. 27), as of 2026-10-27 · in force

The rule

1. All conduct that affects free competition in markets is prohibited and, under the Civil Code, has an unlawful object (objeto ilícito), so agreements of that kind are void. Competition rules cover restrictive practices (agreements, acts and abuse of dominance) and merger control, and apply to anyone who carries out an economic activity or affects it, whatever its legal form, for conduct with total or partial effects in Colombian markets, in any sector.Decreto 2153 de 1992 (art. 46 as added to by Ley 1340 de 2009 art. 2), Art. 46, 1992-12-30 official text · verified 2026-10-27

2. The following agreements are considered contrary to free competition, among others: those whose object or effect is direct or indirect price fixing; discriminatory sale terms for third parties; sharing markets among producers or distributors; allocating production or supply quotas; allocating or limiting sources of inputs; limiting technical development; tying a product to unrelated obligations; refraining from producing or reducing output; collusion in tenders or competitions or distributing awards or fixing bid terms; and preventing third parties from accessing markets or distribution channels. An agreement includes any contract, arrangement, concerted practice or consciously parallel practice between two or more companies.Decreto 2153 de 1992, Art. 45 num. 1 and art. 47 (num. 10 added by Ley 590 de 2000 art. 16), 1992-12-30 official text · verified 2026-10-27

3. Unilateral acts contrary to competition include breaching the advertising rules of the consumer statute, pressuring a company to raise prices or not to cut them, and refusing to sell to or discriminating against a company in retaliation for its pricing policy. Cooperation in research and development of new technology, agreements on non mandatory standards that do not limit entry, and agreements on the use of common facilities are not treated as anticompetitive.Decreto 2153 de 1992, Art. 48 and art. 49, 1992-12-30 official text · verified 2026-10-27

4. A dominant position is the possibility of determining, directly or indirectly, the conditions of a market. When it exists, abuse includes: pricing below cost to eliminate competitors or prevent their entry or expansion; discriminatory conditions for equivalent transactions; tying; selling to one buyer on different terms than another with the intent to reduce or eliminate competition; selling at different prices in different parts of Colombia when the intent or effect is to reduce competition there and the price does not match the cost structure; and obstructing third party access to markets or distribution channels.Decreto 2153 de 1992, Art. 45 num. 5 and art. 50 (num. 6 added by Ley 590 de 2000 art. 16), 1992-12-30 official text · verified 2026-10-27

5. For each infringement, including failing to comply with SIC information requests and orders, obstructing an investigation, failing to report a merger or breaching approval conditions or guarantees accepted to close an investigation, the SIC may fine each infringer up to 100,000 monthly minimum wages or, if greater, up to 150 percent of the profit derived from the conduct. Criteria include market impact, market size, benefit obtained, degree of participation, procedural conduct, market share and the infringer's equity; persistence, prior infringements and acting as leader or instigator aggravate the fine, collaboration mitigates it.
Cost to do it: Maximum fixed fine for a company in 2026: 11,600,000 UVB, COP 140,476,000,000 (about US$44.5 million), per infringement, or 150 percent of the profit if higher.
Example: Cap of 100,000 pre 2024 minimum wages x 116 UVB x COP 12,110 = COP 140,476,000,000. / About us$44.5 million.Ley 1340 de 2009 (rewrites Decreto 2153 de 1992 art. 4 num. 15), Art. 25, 2009-07-24 official text · verified 2026-10-27

6. Any individual who collaborates in, facilitates, authorizes, executes or tolerates anticompetitive conduct may be fined up to 2,000 monthly minimum wages at the time of the sanction. The fine may not be covered, insured or guaranteed, directly or through another person, by the company the individual worked for, its parent or subsidiaries, or any company in the same group or under the same control.
Cost to do it: Maximum fine for an individual in 2026: COP 2,809,520,000 (about US$889,700), paid personally.Ley 1340 de 2009 (rewrites Decreto 2153 de 1992 art. 4 num. 16), Art. 26, 2009-07-24 official text · verified 2026-10-27

7. The SIC's power to sanction expires 5 years after the conduct was carried out or, for continuing conduct, after its last act, unless the sanction has been notified. Investigated parties may ask for confidential treatment of trade secrets by filing a non confidential summary; competitors, consumers and others with a direct interest may intervene within 15 business days after the opening of the investigation is published on the SIC website.Ley 1340 de 2009, Art. 15, art. 19 (as amended by Decreto 19 de 2012 art. 157) and art. 27, 2009-07-24 official text · verified 2026-10-27

8. The SIC may grant total or partial exemption from fines to participants in anticompetitive conduct who report it and provide information and evidence, including the identity of other participants, even if an investigation is already under way; the instigator or promoter of the conduct cannot benefit. Under the regulation, when the application is filed up to the day before the act opening the investigation and stating charges, the first applicant gets full exemption, the second a reduction of 30 to 50 percent and the third up to 25 percent; when filed on or after that date, up to 30, 20 and 15 percent. A leniency applicant who is not first in one case but first to report a different cartel gets an extra 20 percent off (10 percent if filed after charges in the second case), once per investigation. Applications may be filed until the 20 day term to answer the statement of charges expires. Benefits are lost if the applicant disputes the facts it admitted, obstructs evidence, was the instigator or did not stop the conduct immediately.Ley 1340 de 2009; Decreto 1074 de 2015 (chapter 2.2.2.29 replaced by Decreto 253 de 2022, published in Diario Oficial 51.957 of 23 February 2022), Ley 1340 art. 14; Decreto 1074 art. 2.2.2.29.2.2, 2.2.2.29.2.5, 2.2.2.29.3.1 and 2.2.2.29.4.1, 2022-02-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

9. An investigation into restrictive practices can end early if the investigated party offers sufficient guarantees before the deadline to request or provide evidence expires; the SIC then sets how it will verify compliance, and breaching the commitments is itself an infringement subject to fines.Ley 1340 de 2009 (adds par. 1 to Decreto 2153 de 1992 art. 52), Art. 16, 2009-07-24 official text · verified 2026-10-27

10. Anyone who colludes with another in a public tender, public auction, abbreviated selection or competition to unlawfully alter the procurement process commits a crime punished with 6 to 12 years in prison, a fine of 200 to 1,000 monthly minimum wages and an 8 year ban on contracting with the State. A whistleblower who obtains full exemption from the SIC fine in a bid rigging case gets a one third sentence reduction, 40 percent off the criminal fine and a 5 year ban instead of 8. The Constitutional Court upheld the article in Sentencia C-080 of 6 March 2025.Ley 1474 de 2011 (adds art. 410A to the Código Penal, Ley 599 de 2000), Art. 27, 2011-07-12 official text · verified 2026-10-27

11. State intervention mechanisms under the Constitution restrict competition law to the extent of the intervention, including price stabilization funds, agricultural parafiscal funds, minimum guarantee prices, agricultural chain agreements and safeguards. The agricultural sector is a basic sector of the economy, so agreements to stabilize it need a prior binding opinion from the Ministry of Agriculture.Ley 1340 de 2009, Art. 5 and art. 31, 2009-07-24 official text · verified 2026-10-27

12. From 1 January 2024, fines, sanctions and thresholds previously set in monthly minimum wages are calculated through their equivalent in Unidades de Valor Básico (UVB), at 2023 values (one 2023 minimum wage of COP 1,160,000 equals 116 UVB of COP 10,000); tax, customs and exchange control amounts in UVT are excluded. The 2026 UVB is COP 12,110 (Resolución MinHacienda 3488 of 31 December 2025), so each pre 2024 minimum wage cap is worth COP 1,404,760 in 2026.Ley 2294 de 2023 (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo), Art. 313, 2023-05-19 official text · verified 2026-10-27

Applicant	Filed before the act opening the investigation and stating charges	Filed on or after that date
First	Full exemption from the fine	Up to 30% reduction
Second	30% to 50% reduction	Up to 20% reduction
Third	Up to 25% reduction	Up to 15% reduction
Not first here but first to report another cartel	Extra 20% in this case (second case not yet charged)	Extra 10% (second case already charged)

Leniency benefits by order of application (Decreto 1074 de 2015 art. 2.2.2.29.2.2, as replaced by Decreto 253 de 2022)

Who	Legal cap	2026 COP	USD
Company, per infringement	100,000 minimum wages or 150% of profit if higher	140,476,000,000	about US$44.5 million
Individual (not payable or insurable by the employer or group)	2,000 minimum wages	2,809,520,000	about US$889,700

Maximum competition fines in 2026 (pre 2024 minimum wage caps at 116 UVB each and the 2026 UVB of COP 12,110; USD at TRM COP 3,157.94)

Worked example

Three Colombian distributors of medical supplies agree to split hospital tenders by region. One of them applies for leniency before the SIC opens the investigation and states charges: as first applicant it gets full exemption from a fine that could reach COP 140,476,000,000 (about US$44.5 million) or 150 percent of its profit, the second applicant a 30 to 50 percent reduction and the third up to 25 percent. Because the tenders were public, the managers involved also face 6 to 12 years in prison under Código Penal art. 410A, with reduced criminal penalties for a whistleblower that obtained full exemption.
A sales director who approved a price agreement with a competitor can be fined up to COP 2,809,520,000 (about US$889,700) personally; a clause in the director's contract or a D&O policy under which the company or its parent pays that fine is prohibited by Ley 1340 art. 26.

Step by step

Map contacts with competitors (trade associations, joint bids, benchmarking) and remove any exchange of prices, volumes, bids or territories; document legitimate cooperation that fits Decreto 2153 art. 49 (R&D, non mandatory standards, common facilities).
If the company may be dominant in a Colombian market, review rebates, exclusivity, regional pricing and refusals to supply against Decreto 2153 art. 50 before launch.
Adopt an antitrust policy with training for sales and procurement teams and a clear rule against discussing tenders with other bidders.
If a cartel surfaces, decide quickly on leniency: the order of applications and whether charges have been stated determine the benefit; stop participating immediately and preserve evidence.
During an SIC investigation, consider offering guarantees before the evidence stage closes to end it early, and request confidential treatment of trade secrets with a non confidential summary.
Recalculate exposure each January with the new UVB.

Common traps

Consciously parallel conduct counts as an agreement under Decreto 2153 art. 45, so following a competitor's price moves after informal signals can be enough.
Leniency is unavailable to the instigator or promoter, and benefits are lost if the applicant later disputes the facts it admitted or did not stop the conduct at once.
Obstructing an investigation or ignoring an SIC information request is itself an infringement fined on the same scale as a cartel.
Individual fines cannot be indemnified or insured by the employer or any group company.
Bid rigging in public procurement is both an administrative infringement and a crime; an SIC settlement does not end criminal exposure, it only reduces it for a fully exempt whistleblower.

Sources

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