Countries › Mexico › Guide › 13. Regulation › Antitrust conduct in Mexico: cartels, abuse of dominance, dawn raids, leniency and fines under the Federal Economic Competition Law

Antitrust conduct in Mexico: cartels, abuse of dominance, dawn raids, leniency and fines under the Federal Economic Competition Law

Last verified: 2026-10-26 · Status: Changing

Agreements between competitors to fix prices, restrict output, divide markets or rig bids are void and fined up to 15 percent of income, and their individuals face five to ten years in prison under the Federal Criminal Code. Thirteen vertical and unilateral practices, from exclusivity and resale price maintenance to refusal to deal and margin squeeze, are unlawful only when a firm with substantial market power uses them to exclude rivals, and are fined up to 10 percent of income. The National Antimonopoly Commission can raid offices and devices without a court order, the first cartel member to report gets the minimum fine and immunity from prosecution, and firms under investigation for other conduct can close the file with commitments if they act early.

USD conversions use MXN 18.6638 per US dollar, the US Federal Reserve H.10 noon buying rate in New York for 23 October 2026 (FRED series DEXMXUS), the latest observation available when this page was verified. Peso amounts set in UMA use the 2026 daily UMA of MXN 117.31, in force since 1 February 2026 (INEGI publication in the DOF of 9 January 2026, as cited in IMSS Technical Council agreement ACDO.AS2.HCT.270126/9.P.DIR). Conversions are for orientation only.

Key facts

Maximum fine for relative monopolistic practices	10 % of incomeLFCE art. 127, section V, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum fine for individuals taking part in monopolistic practices	350000 UMALFCE art. 127, section X, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum disqualification of directors and officers	5 yearsLFCE art. 127, section X, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Minimum prison term for the criminal cartel offence	5 yearsCPF art. 254 bis, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum prison term for the criminal cartel offence	10 yearsCPF art. 254 bis, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum initial investigation period (extendable three times by up to 120 days)	120 business daysLFCE arts. 71 and 114, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Maximum duration of a verification visit (extendable once)	2 monthsLFCE art. 75, section II, as of 2026-10-26 · in force
Limitation period for sanctioning monopolistic practices	10 yearsLFCE art. 137, as of 2026-10-26 · in force

The rule

1. Absolute monopolistic practices (cartels). Contracts, agreements, arrangements, combinations or information exchanges between actual or potential competitors are unlawful when their object or effect is to (I) fix, raise, agree or manipulate purchase or sale prices; (II) restrict or limit output, distribution or purchases; (III) divide, distribute or assign current or potential markets by customers, suppliers, times or spaces; or (IV) agree or coordinate bids or abstentions in tenders, auctions or public bidding. They are void by operation of law, with no legal effect, and carry sanctions plus civil and criminal liability. The fine runs from one UMA up to 15 percent of the economic agent's income; where income is not declared or not available through the agent's fault, from one to 3 million UMA.
Cost to do it: Exposure, not a fee: up to 15 percent of income, or up to 3,000,000 UMA (MXN 351,930,000, about USD 18.86 million) where income cannot be established.
Example: Two cement distributors that agree a minimum price in a region, with Mexican income of MXN 5,000,000,000 each, each risk up to MXN 750,000,000. / About USD 40.18 million each on income of about USD 267.90 million.Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (LFCE), art. 53 reformed and section V repealed by decree DOF 16 July 2025; arts. 127 and 128 reformed by the same decree, Arts. 53, 127, section IV, and 128, section I, 2025-07-16 official text · verified 2026-10-26 · changed: Decree DOF 16 July 2025 reworded art. 53, repealed its section V and raised the cartel fine cap to 15 percent of income.

2. Criminal cartel offence. Whoever enters into, orders or executes agreements between competing economic agents to fix prices, restrict output, divide markets, rig bids or exchange information for any of those purposes faces five to ten years in prison and 1,000 to 10,000 days fine. Prosecution requires a complaint by the competition authority, which can only be filed with the statement of probable responsibility. Economic agents who obtain leniency under LFCE art. 103 have no criminal liability, and proceedings may be dismissed at the request of the authority's board when the accused complies with the administrative sanctions. The text of the Criminal Code still names COFECE and the IFT; under the 2025 decree, references to COFECE are read as references to the CNA.
Cost to do it: Exposure for individuals: prison and day fines. Defense counsel and internal investigation costs typically start as soon as a raid or information request arrives.
Example: A sales director who emails a competitor to agree a bid in a state tender can face both the administrative fine of up to 350,000 UMA and a criminal case of five to ten years. / 350,000 UMA is MXN 41,058,500, about USD 2.20 million.Código Penal Federal, art. 254 bis added DOF 10 May 2011 and reformed DOF 23 May 2014, last reform of the code DOF 13 March 2026; decree reforming the LFCE, DOF 16 July 2025, transitory Sixth, CPF art. 254 bis; transitory Sixth of the decree of DOF 16 July 2025, 2014-05-23 official text · verified 2026-10-26

3. Relative monopolistic practices (abuse of dominance and exclusionary conduct). Any act, contract, agreement, procedure or combination is unlawful when (I) it fits one of the thirteen conducts in art. 56; (II) it is carried out by one or more agents with substantial power, individually or jointly, in the relevant market where it occurs; and (III) it has or may have the object or effect of unduly displacing rivals, substantially impeding their access, creating exclusive advantages or unduly limiting their ability to compete. The conducts include exclusive distribution and non compete obligations between non competitors, imposing resale prices, tying, exclusive dealing, refusal to deal, boycotts, predatory pricing, loyalty discounts conditioned on exclusivity, cross subsidies, price discrimination, raising rivals' costs, denial of access to an essential input and margin squeeze. Relevant market is defined by substitutes, including foreign ones, distribution costs, tariffs and regulatory barriers. Fines run up to 10 percent of income, or one to 2 million UMA where income is unknown.
Cost to do it: Exposure: up to 10 percent of income, or up to 2,000,000 UMA (MXN 234,620,000, about USD 12.57 million) where income is unknown. Defending a market power case usually needs economists for market definition.
Example: A dominant beverage supplier that grants retailers rebates only if they stop selling rival brands can be sanctioned under art. 56, section VIII; the same clause used by a small entrant is lawful because it lacks substantial power. / On Mexican income of USD 267.90 million, the cap is about USD 26.79 million.Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, arts. 54 and 56, art. 54 section III reformed by decree DOF 16 July 2025, Arts. 54, 56, 58, 127, section V, and 128, section II, 2025-07-16 official text · verified 2026-10-26

4. Investigations and dawn raids. The Investigative Authority opens a probe when there is an objective cause, meaning any indication of monopolistic practices or unlawful concentrations. The investigation period runs 30 to 120 business days from the opening order and may be extended up to three times by up to 120 days each when justified. The Investigative Authority may order unannounced verification visits: inspectors may enter any office, premises, vehicle, computer, device or archive, review and copy books and files in any format, seal and secure documents for the duration of the visit, take photographs and video, and question staff, with police support if needed. Visits may last up to two months, extendable once for the same period. If access is refused or information withheld, the facts imputed are presumed true, besides coercive measures and possible criminal liability. The company may make observations during the visit and offer evidence within five days. False information is fined up to 200,000 UMA.
Cost to do it: Plan for a raid protocol, document retention and counsel on call. False statements to the Commission: up to 200,000 UMA (MXN 23,462,000, about USD 1.26 million).
Example: If staff delete chats from a phone during a visit, the obstruction is recorded in the minutes, the facts imputed are presumed true and the company faces coercive measures and possible criminal liability. / An investigation opened in January can run 120 business days and, with three extensions, up to 480 business days, close to two years, before the statement of probable responsibility.Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, arts. 71 and 75 (art. 71 reformed DOF 16 July 2025), arts. 114 and 127, section III, Arts. 71, 75, 114 and 127, section III, 2025-07-16 official text · verified 2026-10-26

5. Leniency for cartels and commitments for other conduct. The first cartel participant to come forward, before an investigation is opened in that market, with enough evidence to presume the practice, that cooperates fully and continuously and ends its participation (unless asked to continue temporarily) receives the minimum fine, is not disqualified and is not subject to class actions brought by the Commission, although third parties may still sue. Later applicants that bring additional evidence may obtain reductions of up to 50, 30 or 20 percent of the maximum fine, in chronological order. Identities are confidential, and leniency may only be requested until publication of the third extension of the investigation. For relative practices and unlawful concentrations, the agent under investigation may, once, offer commitments to suspend, suppress or correct the conduct; if offered before the third extension of the investigation, the Commission may close the file without finding liability; later, during the trial like procedure, acceptance brings a reduction of up to 50 percent of the fine and requires admitting the conduct.
Cost to do it: Leniency and commitments are free to request; the cost is internal investigation, document collection and the business cost of the commitments.
Example: A distributor that discovers its regional managers swapped price lists with a rival and applies first, before any investigation, gets the minimum fine and its managers avoid prosecution under CPF art. 254 bis. / Against a potential fine of up to USD 40.18 million on USD 267.90 million of income, the first applicant pays the minimum; a third applicant could get at most a 20 percent reduction from the cap.Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, arts. 100 and 103 reformed by decree DOF 16 July 2025 (art. 101 repealed), Arts. 100 and 103, 2025-07-16 official text · verified 2026-10-26 · changed: Decree DOF 16 July 2025 reformed art. 100 (full closure only if commitments are offered before the third extension; up to 50 percent reduction afterwards) and art. 103 (cut off at the third extension), and repealed art. 101.

6. Individual liability, damages and limitation. Directors, managers, officers, agents and representatives who take part in monopolistic practices or unlawful concentrations on behalf of a company can be disqualified for up to five years in the relevant market and fined up to 350,000 UMA; anyone who aids, facilitates or induces them can be fined up to 300,000 UMA. Persons harmed may bring individual or class actions for damages before the specialized competition courts once the Commission has issued its resolution; the final resolution proves the unlawful conduct and the limitation period for damages runs from it. The Commission's power to open sanction proceedings lapses ten years after the conduct ceased. Fines are individualized by gravity, harm, intent, market share, market size, duration and economic capacity, and fines set in UMA use the UMA in force when the conduct took place.
Cost to do it: Individual fines: up to 350,000 UMA (MXN 41,058,500, about USD 2.20 million) for participants and up to 300,000 UMA (MXN 35,193,000, about USD 1.89 million) for facilitators.
Example: A purchasing company that overpaid during a proven cartel can sue the cartel members for damages after the CNA's final resolution, without having to prove the cartel again. / A conduct that ended in March 2020 can still be sanctioned until March 2030.Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, arts. 127, sections X and XI, 130, 134 and 137, reformed by decree DOF 16 July 2025, Arts. 127, sections X and XI, 130, 134 and 137, 2025-07-16 official text · verified 2026-10-26 · changed: Decree DOF 16 July 2025 raised individual fines (350,000 UMA) and set the ten year limitation period counted from when the conduct ceased.

Infringement	Fine based on income	Fine if income unknown	2026 MXN (cap where income unknown)
Cartel (absolute practice)	1 UMA up to 15 percent of income	1 to 3,000,000 UMA	MXN 351,930,000
Abuse of dominance (relative practice)	1 UMA up to 10 percent	1 to 2,000,000 UMA	MXN 234,620,000
Unlawful concentration	1 UMA up to 10 percent	1 to 2,000,000 UMA	MXN 234,620,000
Breach of merger conditions	1 UMA up to 12 percent	1 to 3,000,000 UMA	MXN 351,930,000
False information to the Commission	1 to 200,000 UMA		MXN 23,462,000
Individuals taking part	Up to 350,000 UMA and up to 5 years disqualification		MXN 41,058,500
Facilitators	1 to 300,000 UMA		MXN 35,193,000

Fines under LFCE arts. 127 and 128 (2026 peso amounts at UMA MXN 117.31; USD at MXN 18.6638)

Worked example

A foreign owned auto parts maker learns in an internal audit that its Mexican sales head agreed price increases with two competitors. It applies for leniency before any CNA investigation in that market: if it is first, cooperates and stops the conduct, it pays the minimum fine and its managers have no criminal liability (LFCE art. 103; CPF art. 254 bis). If it waits until a dawn raid, the company faces up to 15 percent of income, about USD 40.18 million on USD 267.90 million of Mexican income, and the sales head faces five to ten years in prison.

Step by step

1. Adopt a written competition policy covering contacts with competitors, trade associations and bids; train sales and procurement teams every year.
2. Map where the business may hold substantial power and review exclusivity, loyalty rebates, resale price clauses and refusals to supply against LFCE art. 56.
3. Prepare a dawn raid protocol: reception instructions, counsel on call, IT staff briefed not to delete data, and a log of everything copied (LFCE art. 75).
4. If a problem is found, decide quickly on leniency: the first applicant before an investigation gets the full benefit, and requests close at the third extension of an investigation (LFCE art. 103).
5. For non cartel conduct under investigation, consider commitments before the third extension to close the file without liability (LFCE art. 100).

Common traps

Information exchange alone can be a cartel: art. 53 covers exchanges of information between competitors with a cartel object or effect, and CPF art. 254 bis, section V criminalizes such exchanges.
Assuming vertical clauses are always safe: exclusivity and resale price clauses become unlawful when the supplier has substantial power and the clause excludes rivals (LFCE arts. 54 and 56).
Refusing access during a raid: the facts imputed are presumed true and coercive measures and criminal liability follow (LFCE art. 75, section IV).
Waiting too long for leniency or commitments: both benefits close at the third extension of the investigation (LFCE arts. 100 and 103).
Thinking the case ends with the fine: harmed buyers can sue for damages with the CNA resolution as proof of the unlawful conduct (LFCE art. 134).

Sources

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