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Anti corruption and bribery rules in Uruguay

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Last verified: 2026-10-27 · Status: Stable

Uruguay punishes bribery of public officials under the Penal Code, as rewritten by the 1998 Anti Corruption Law (Ley 17.060): officials who take bribes face up to six years, and whoever induces them is punished for the mere instigation. Influence peddling, extortion by officials, conflicts of interest and, since 2024, illicit enrichment are also crimes, and paying a foreign official to win or ease a Uruguayan foreign trade deal is transnational bribery with up to three years. Fines are set in UR (up to 15,000 UR, about US$724,000), proceeds can be confiscated, and corruption offences are predicates for money laundering.

USD figures use UYU 40.210 per US dollar, the BCU quotation for DLS. USA BILLETE on 27 October 2026; amounts in Unidades Indexadas (UI) use UYU 6.6792 per UI, the BCU quotation for 27 October 2026, both retrieved from the BCU quotations service on 27 October 2026. Amounts in Unidades Reajustables (UR) use UYU 1,940.77 per UR, the value fixed by Decreto 229/026 (IMPO lists it as the latest UR, in force for September 2026). Conversions are rounded and for orientation only.

Key facts

Maximum prison term for simple bribery (official)	3 yearsCódigo Penal art. 157, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Maximum prison term for influence peddling	4 yearsCódigo Penal art. 158 BIS, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Maximum fine for aggravated bribery	10000 URCódigo Penal art. 158, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Illicit enrichment of officials is a crime	Yes, since 2024 Código Penal art. 159 BIS (Ley 20.347), as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Maximum prison term for illicit enrichment	6 yearsCódigo Penal art. 159 BIS, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Offering or inducing a bribe punished even if not accepted	Yes, as instigation Código Penal art. 159, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Scope of transnational bribery offence	Bribes to foreign officials to obtain or facilitate Uruguayan foreign trade deals Ley 17.060 art. 29, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Confiscation of proceeds of corruption offences	Yes Código Penal art. 163 QUATER, as of 2026-10-27 · in force
Corruption is a money laundering predicate	Yes Ley 19.574 art. 34 numeral 16, as of 2026-10-27 · in force

The rule

1. A public official is anyone who holds an office or performs a function, paid or unpaid, permanent or temporary, of a legislative, administrative or judicial nature, in the State, a municipality or any public entity or non state public person. This wide definition covers employees of state companies and non state public bodies.
Cost to do it: No direct cost; compliance programmes should treat staff of state owned companies as public officials.
Example: An engineer of a state owned utility evaluating a supplier tender is a public official under art. 175. / A US contractor dealing with a Uruguayan state oil, power or telecom company is dealing with public officials.Código Penal art. 175 as reworded by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 8, Código Penal art. 175, 1998-12-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

2. An official who, to perform an act of office, receives for themselves or a third party an undue payment or accepts its promise commits simple bribery, punished with 3 months of prisión to 3 years of penitenciaría, a fine of 10 UR to 5,000 UR and special disqualification of 2 to 4 years; the penalty is reduced by one third to one half when the payment is for an act already performed. An official who takes money or another benefit, or its promise, to delay or omit an act or to act against their duties commits aggravated bribery, punished with 12 months of prisión to 6 years of penitenciaría, disqualification of 2 to 6 years and a fine of 50 UR to 10,000 UR, increased by one third to one half when it results in a public job, favours a party in litigation, or results in a contract with the official's agency or abuse of procurement procedures.
Cost to do it: Fines: simple bribery 10 UR (about UYU 19,408, US$483) to 5,000 UR (about UYU 9,703,850, US$241,329); aggravated bribery 50 UR (about UYU 97,038, US$2,413) to 10,000 UR (about UYU 19,407,700, US$482,659).
Example: A customs officer who accepts UYU 50,000 to speed up a lawful clearance commits simple bribery; one who accepts it to skip an inspection commits aggravated bribery. / A payment of US$20,000 to a procurement officer to win a state contract triggers the aggravated form with the increase for contracts with the official's agency.Código Penal art. 157 and 158 as reworded by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 8, Código Penal art. 157 and 158, 1998-12-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

3. Whoever induces a public official to commit simple or aggravated bribery is punished for the mere instigation with one half to two thirds of the principal penalty for the official. It is a special aggravating factor if the induced official is a police officer or law enforcement official acting in that capacity, or one of the senior officials listed in Ley 17.060 art. 10 and 11 (who must file asset declarations).
Cost to do it: Criminal exposure for the payer and anyone who arranges the payment; cost of anti bribery controls over agents and intermediaries.
Example: A company manager who offers a municipal inspector money to overlook a breach commits soborno even if the inspector refuses, because instigation is punished. / A foreign investor whose local agent offers a payment to a minister's adviser faces the aggravating factor if the adviser is a declared senior official.Código Penal art. 159 as reworded by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 8, Código Penal art. 159, 1998-12-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

4. Whoever, invoking real or simulated influence, solicits, receives or accepts the promise of an economic benefit in order to influence decisively an official to delay or omit an act or to act against their duties commits influence peddling, punished with 3 months of prisión to 4 years of penitenciaría, reduced by one third to one half when the aim is to obtain a proper act of office; it is aggravated if the target is a senior official listed in Ley 17.060 art. 10 and 11. An official who forces or induces someone to give or promise an undue benefit commits concusión, with 12 months of prisión to 6 years of penitenciaría, a fine of 50 UR to 10,000 UR and disqualification of 2 to 6 years.
Cost to do it: Cost of vetting lobbyists, consultants and success fee arrangements with people claiming access to officials.
Example: A consultant who charges a success fee by claiming a minister will reverse a permit refusal commits influence peddling. / A US investor paying a local fixer US$50,000 to secure a permit through contacts risks being drawn into an influence peddling case.Código Penal art. 158 BIS added by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 9; art. 156 as reworded by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 8, Código Penal art. 156 and 158 BIS, 1998-12-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

5. An official who, with or without deceit, takes an interest in an act or contract in which they intervene by reason of office to obtain an undue benefit, or fails to disclose a personal link with the private party, is punished with 6 months of prisión to 3 years of penitenciaría, disqualification of 2 to 4 years and a fine of 10 UR to 10,000 UR. An official who deceptively harms the Administration in acts or contracts commits fraud, with 12 months of prisión to 6 years of penitenciaría and a fine of 50 UR to 15,000 UR. An official who misuses reserved information for economic benefit faces 3 months of prisión to 4 years of penitenciaría and a fine of 10 UR to 10,000 UR. These offences are aggravated if committed by a declared senior official or if the official obtained a patrimonial enrichment, and the judge may confiscate the direct or indirect proceeds.
Cost to do it: Fines up to 15,000 UR (about UYU 29,111,550, US$723,988) for fraud; confiscation of proceeds.
Example: A supplier that hires a relative of the official evaluating its bid exposes the official to art. 161 and itself to scrutiny as an accessory. / Profits from a US$1 million contract obtained through an official's undisclosed interest can be confiscated by the court.Código Penal art. 160 and 161 as reworded by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 8; art. 163 BIS, 163 TER and 163 QUATER added by Ley Nº 17.060 art. 9, Código Penal art. 160, 161, 163 BIS, 163 TER and 163 QUATER, 1998-12-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

6. An official who must file a sworn asset declaration and who, during office or up to two years after leaving it, unduly obtains through the function or the illegal management of public funds a significant and unjustified increase in wealth relative to lawful income, directly or through another person, commits illicit enrichment, punished with 18 months to 6 years of penitenciaría, a fine of 50 UR to 15,000 UR and disqualification of 2 to 5 years.
Cost to do it: Fine 50 UR (about UYU 97,038, US$2,413) to 15,000 UR (about UYU 29,111,550, US$723,988).
Example: A former director of a state company who bought several properties with no explained income within two years after leaving office can be prosecuted. / Payments routed to a front company owned by an official's relative can be traced as the official's unjustified enrichment.Código Penal art. 159 BIS added by Ley Nº 20.347 (single article), Código Penal art. 159 BIS, 2024-09-19 official text · verified 2026-10-27 · changed: Ley Nº 20.347 of 19 September 2024 created the crime of illicit enrichment as Código Penal art. 159 BIS.

7. Whoever, to conclude or facilitate a Uruguayan foreign trade deal, offers or grants, in Uruguay or abroad, money or another economic benefit to a public official of another State, for themselves or another, commits transnational bribery, punished with 3 months of prisión to 3 years of penitenciaría. For acts abroad the law refers to the conditions of Código Penal art. 10 numeral 5: the act must be punishable both abroad and in Uruguay, the Uruguayan offender must be found in Uruguay and not be requested by the foreign State, and the more lenient law applies. The fact that bribe money was destined to political purposes does not by itself make the offence a political crime for extradition purposes.
Cost to do it: Criminal exposure for exporters and their agents; cost of controls over foreign sales intermediaries.
Example: A Uruguayan meat exporter that pays an official in a buyer country to obtain a sanitary approval commits transnational bribery. / A Uruguayan executive who pays a foreign customs officer US$5,000 to clear Uruguayan exports, including in neighbouring Argentina, is exposed under art. 29 if the conduct is also punishable there.Ley Nº 17.060 (Anti Corruption Law), art. 29 and 33; Código Penal art. 10 numeral 5, Ley 17.060 art. 29 and 33; Código Penal art. 10, 1998-12-23 official text · verified 2026-10-27

8. The President, ministers, legislators, judges, mayors and a long list of senior officials, including members of regulatory unit commissions, prosecutors, senior tax officials and inspectors, and directors and managers of state companies (entes autónomos and servicios descentralizados), must file sworn declarations of assets and income with the Junta de Transparencia y Ética Pública (JUTEP). Failure to file on time or false declarations are serious breaches, and the JUTEP may investigate suspicious declarations. Offences against the Public Administration in Title IV of Book II of the Penal Code (public corruption offences) are predicate crimes for money laundering.
Cost to do it: No cost for private parties; due diligence on counterparties should flag dealings with declared officials as politically exposed persons.
Example: Money paid to a bribed official and then invested in a Uruguayan apartment can be prosecuted as laundering. / A US investor partnering with a company owned by a current director of a state entity should treat the director as a politically exposed person and run enhanced checks.Ley Nº 17.060 art. 10, 11 and 17; Ley Nº 19.574 art. 34 numeral 16, Ley 17.060 art. 10, 11 and 17; Ley 19.574 art. 34, 2017-12-20 official text · verified 2026-10-27

Offence	Article	Prison	Fine	Max fine approx. UYU	Max fine approx. USD
Concusión (extortion by official)	CP 156	12 months to 6 years	50 to 10,000 UR	19,407,700	482,659
Simple bribery	CP 157	3 months to 3 years	10 to 5,000 UR	9,703,850	241,329
Aggravated bribery	CP 158	12 months to 6 years (+1/3 to 1/2 if contract)	50 to 10,000 UR	19,407,700	482,659
Influence peddling	CP 158 BIS	3 months to 4 years
Inducing bribery (soborno)	CP 159	1/2 to 2/3 of the official's penalty
Illicit enrichment	CP 159 BIS	18 months to 6 years	50 to 15,000 UR	29,111,550	723,988
Fraud against the Administration	CP 160	12 months to 6 years	50 to 15,000 UR	29,111,550	723,988
Conflict of interest	CP 161	6 months to 3 years	10 to 10,000 UR	19,407,700	482,659
Transnational bribery	Ley 17.060 art. 29	3 months to 3 years

Main offences and penalties (UYU and USD at the rates in the FX note)

Worked example

Inspection payment: a factory manager offers a municipal inspector UYU 100,000 (about US$2,487) not to report a safety breach. The offer alone is soborno by instigation of aggravated bribery (CP art. 158 and 159); if accepted, the inspector faces up to 6 years and a fine up to 10,000 UR (about UYU 19,407,700).
Agent risk: a foreign company hires a consultant on a success fee who claims he can get a permit through his friendship with a director. If the consultant asks for money to influence the director to act against his duties, the consultant commits influence peddling (CP art. 158 BIS), and the company risks being treated as an instigator or accessory.
Export deal: a Uruguayan company pays US$15,000 to an official of a foreign buyer state to approve a contract for Uruguayan goods; this is transnational bribery under Ley 17.060 art. 29 if the conditions of CP art. 10 numeral 5 are met.

Step by step

Adopt a written anti bribery policy covering officials of the State, municipalities, state companies and non state public bodies, and foreign officials in export deals.
Vet agents, consultants and lobbyists; avoid success fees tied to official decisions without clear, documented services.
Record gifts, hospitality and donations involving officials and set low approval thresholds.
Screen counterparties for links to officials listed in Ley 17.060 art. 10 and 11 and treat them as politically exposed persons.
Train sales staff in export markets on transnational bribery and keep payment trails transparent.
Report and stop suspicious payments; corruption proceeds also create money laundering exposure.

Common traps

Offering a bribe is punished even if the official refuses, because the instigation itself is the offence.
Employees of state owned companies and non state public bodies are public officials.
Facilitation payments are not excepted: paying for a proper act of office is still simple bribery.
Influence peddling catches intermediaries selling access, even if the influence is fictitious.
Corruption proceeds are laundering predicates, so investing them in Uruguay creates separate criminal exposure.
The transnational offence is limited to foreign trade deals and depends on the conditions of CP art. 10 numeral 5; foreign laws such as the US FCPA may still apply to the same conduct.

Sources

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